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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 282

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 06/01/1992

Where it occurred: not made available

Country: Kuwait

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: KMOD 43/SER 30

Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K6

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: Ordnance

Ground condition: demolition site
(explosives)

Date record created: 19/02/2004

Date last modified: 19/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
safety distances ignored (?)

Accident report
The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The
following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made
available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in
Kuwait at the time of the accident.
Information came from staff of a British demining company that had BAC teams unloading
serviceable ammunition at a designated Kuwait Ministry of Defence ammunition Depot. The
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group were making field storage stacks in accordance with the principles of UK Ammunition
storage regulations. Unfortunately, all organisations, including National Army teams from
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Egypt, were also unloading at the same depot. There was no
overall control of this and each organisation “did its own thing”. The entire dump contained an
estimated 15000 tons of ammunition.
The British company’s storage area was designed to minimise the propagation of a fire should
an event occur. However, other organisations saw the large gaps in the ammo stacks and
filled them, in some cases with loose propellant and BM21 rockets (facing in every direction).
Despite protests by the demining company to KMOD, nothing was done to stop or correct the
dangerous situation.
A small fire started in an unknown area (rumour had it that a pipe-smoker knocking out his
pipe started the fire) and rapidly spread to the field storage sites where its spread was
accelerated by BM21 rockets and other projectiles “going ballistic”. Six local trucks hired to
the British demining company, were destroyed.
The demining company staff present retreated to within an Explosive Storage Site (protective
walls etc). They withdrew from the site when it was safe to do so and were evacuated without
injury. Many Thai TCNs (Third Country Nationals) were missing for the night but were found
safe in the morning. They had dug themselves into the sand for self preservation and survived
unscathed.
One casualty was a subcontractor of the British commercial company. This was a Palestinian
who was an “owner/driver” and went back to try to get his truck out. The ex-pats trying to
organise an orderly withdrawal saw him and his truck “vaporised”. Two KMOD soldiers and
another individual were also reported to have been killed. (Only the driver is recorded in this
database because he was an indirect employee of the British demining company: the status
of the others is unknown.)

Victim Report
Victim number: 358

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: driver

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
FATAL
COMMENT
Victim was seen "vaporised".
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because
the dangers at the site were known and no action was taken to make the area safe.
There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any
reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.
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